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IN THIS short, but interesting book, Robert Patman argues that 
US policy failures in the lead up to 
and aftermath of the October 1993 
‘Blackhawk Down’ incident in Mo- 
gadishu facilitated the conditions for 
the terrorist attacks on the US main-
land in 2001. The thesis that the US 
merely reaped the bad fruit of its for-
eign policy on 9/11 is not new, but 
Patman’s approach is. 
Rather than blame the historical 
content of US foreign policy (as a 
form of neo-imperialism that bred 
resentment in the Muslim world), he 
argues that the US failure to adapt 
to the changed security environment 
that followed the end of the Cold War, 
particularly the impact of globalisa-
tion and the resurgence of primordial 
conflicts in failed states, contributed 
heavily to al-Qaeda’s rise as a politi-
cal actor as well as its ability to project 
irregular force world-wide.
Patman places the failed 1992-94 
UN attempt at peace enforcement in 
Somalia at the centre of his claim. The 
crux of his argument is that the US 
misread the post Cold War interna-
tional security environment because 
it remained locked in a realist mindset 
focused on inter-state conflict and 
contingency planning for major war 
in which overwhelming force was the 
preferred way of engaging in combat 
operations (under the so-called ‘Pow-
ell Doctrine’ implemented in the first 
Gulf War). This prevented it from un-
derstanding the opportunity provided 
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to unconventional warfare actors by 
failed states, which were considered 
too peripheral to ‘core’ US security 
interests to warrant full attention. This 
made the US resistant to participate in 
UN-led humanitarian intervention in 
low intensity conflicts in failed states, 
and when it did belatedly intervene as 
part of a UN-led multinational force 
in Somalia in 1992, it did so on an ad 
hoc and short-term basis in which an 
exit strategy was a major priority and 
mission creep was a constant as the 
rationale for intervention shifted from 
famine relief to confronting warlords 
and imposing order.
US failure to adopt a ‘tough’ ap-
proach to peace enforcement in Soma-
lia was due to an aversion to casual-
ties and Congressional resistance to 
expanding the mission into combat 
roles, coupled with misgivings about 
allowing US soldiers to serve under 
foreign commanders, all under blan-
ket media coverage of events on the 
ground. The latter turned the aborted 
attempt to capture General Mohamed 
Farah Aideed in October 1993 into a 
‘major league CNN-era disaster’, ac-
cording to one of the decision makers 
involved (p. 58). 
The failure to capture Aideed 
emboldened not only Somali warlords 
but also al-Qaeda, which had opera-
tives on the round in Mogadishu (to 
include people involved in the Black-
hawk Down incident), whose leader-
ship saw the US withdrawal from 
Somalia in 1994 as evidence of a lack 
of US stomach to engage in irregular 
conflicts where its core interests were 
not immediately involved. 
US aversion to taking casualties 
was a legacy of the so-called ‘Viet-
nam Syndrome’, which along with 
the ‘CNN effect’ of real-time uncen-
sored news coverage compounded 
US administration concerns about 
the negative domestic political impact 
of involvement in UN peacekeeping 
missions. That led to the ‘Somalia 
Syndrome’ (a term apparently coined 
by Senator John Kerry, as quoted on 
page 83), which was codified in the 
Presidential Decision Directive 25 of 
May 1994 outlining the seven criteria 
that were required for a use of US 
force in multinational peacekeeping 
efforts. 
Given the difficulties in meet-
ing those requirements, PDD 25 
amounted to a refusal by the US to 
get involved in sub-national conflicts 
in failed states (such as in Rwanda), 
and when it did (be in Haiti, Bosnia, or 
the containment of Saddam Hussein), 
it did so tentatively and always with 
its eye on the door. Patman contends 
that this led to a power vacuum into 
which al-Qaeda flowed, which then 
allowed it to plan and carry out the 
9/11 attacks. By the time the US 
realised the seriousness of the al-
Qaeda threat, it was too late.
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There are some oddities in the 
book. Much of chapter two, which 
details the George H. W. Bush admin-
istration’s reluctant and confused par-
ticipation in the Somalia imbroglio, is 
based upon interviews conducted in 
1999-2000 by the author with former 
US policy-makers. 
Likewise, chapter four, which 
disingenuously argues that, in spite 
of its much smaller commitment of 
military assets in a much more benign 
security environment in Baidoa, the 
Australian role in Somalia offers an 
alternative model to the failed US 
approach in Mogadishu, is based on 
interviews and primary data collec-
tion done in 1994-95. 
Yet there is not a single interview 
with Clinton-era decision makers and 
much less primary source data on US 
security policy from 1994-2001 even 
though the bulk of the failures to 
recognise the looming threat of trans-
national terrorism ostensibly occurred 
during that period (which is the sub-
ject of chapters five through seven). 
The book has a retro-fitted feel to it, 
as if Patman started another research 
project about Somalia in the 1990s, 
put it down for almost a decade, then 
cobbled together an ex post argument 
about the ‘march’ to 9/11 using his 
original interview data and primary 
sources on the H.W. Bush administra-
tion’s and Australian approaches to 
‘Operation Restore Hope’ along with 
mostly secondary data on everything 
that followed.
This leaves some gaps in Pat-
man’s interpretation of the Clinton 
administration’s approach to interna-
tional security affairs, particularly its 
commitment to cooperative security, 
multilateralism and operations other 
than war (in fact, the cornerstone of 
the original Clinton approach, co-
operative security, is not mentioned 
once in the entire book). In explicit 
contrast to the H.W. Bush administra-
tion’s view of international security, 
the Clinton administration initially 
worked hard to develop a form of 
‘Wilsonian pragmatism’ that sup-
ported UN peacekeeping and nation-
building efforts under the banner of 
‘assertive multilateralism’. 
Its original cadre of foreign 
policy appointees understood they 
were faced with a changed geopoliti-
cal landscape and attempted to meld 
idealist and constructivist initiatives 
into the US foreign policy paradigm 
while maintaining the core realist 
principles that were the backbone of 
US national security policy. Those ef-
forts were undermined from the onset 
by Republican-majority congres-
sional opposition to US participation 
in peace enforcement missions. 
They also were the subject of 
intense debates between Clinton 
appointees such as Secretary of 
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State Madeline Albright and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs Morton Halperin (who is 
never mentioned and yet was a key 
polarising figure in US defence cir-
cles on the subject of peace-keeping) 
and more traditional-minded policy-
makers in the Pentagon, CIA and 
NSC such as Secretaries of Defence 
William Perry and William Cohen. 
After the Blackhawk Down inci-
dent and given the political balance 
of power within the foreign policy 
bureaucracy and vis a vis Congress, 
and confronted by a pressing domestic 
agenda, Clinton had to relent on his 
commitment to the type of aggressive 
multilateralism that Patman believes 
would have averted 9/11. By 1996 
pragmatists had won over idealists 
and constructivists in inter-agency 
debates, and realism was restored 
as the dominant lens through which 
international security affairs was 
viewed.
Thus, it was not so much US 
failure to recognise and adapt to the 
post-Cold War international security 
regime as it was the opposition of 
political opponents, inter-agency 
policy disagreements on how to re-
spond and leadership weakness and 
myopia (in the persons of Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush, respectively) 
that thwarted any hope that the US 
would change its cautious approach 
to multilateral armed interventions 
in peripheral failed states in which 
irregular warfare actors congregated. 
That set the stage for al-Qaeda’s rise 
and 9/11.
Along with some minor editorial 
errors, the omissions in Patman’s co- 
verage of the Clinton administration’s 
perspective do not detract from his 
argument. His coverage of the W. 
Bush administration’s non-response 
to the looming irregular threat, while 
also heavily reliant on secondary 
sources, is succinct and convincing 
in showing that Bush and his advi-
sors ignored the belated warnings 
offered them by their predecessors. 
Although the book is not meant to be 
an academic treatise, in chapter seven 
Patman gives it a measure of schol-
arly gravitas by persuasively offering 
four ‘causal associations’ to justify 
his claims about the link between the 
Somalia Syndrome and 9/11 (consis- 
tency, strength, specificity and cohe- 
rence of association (pp.136-40)). 
As an alternative interpretation 
of events Patman presents a well-
organised narrative that is richly de-
tailed and very well documented, in a 
good example of a ‘thick description’ 
approach to foreign policy analysis. 
As such the book is a worthy addition 
to the literature on US foreign policy 
after the Cold War.
